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Ukraine1
Ab stract
The ar ti cle pres ents an institutionalization con cept in a post-so viet so ci -
ety. The dou ble institutionalization phe nom e non was de scribed as a
spe cific so cial mech a nism which sup ports so cial sta bil ity and in te gra -
tion un der con di tions when in sti tu tional bases of so cial life are ru in ing.
In or der to test hy poth e ses on spe cific char ac ter and ten den cies of
post-so viet institutionalization and new so cial in sti tu tion for ma tion,
au thors use the data of so cio log i cal mon i tor ing on so cial changes in
Ukrai nian so ci ety con ducted by the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of the NAS of
Ukraine for many years.
Cat e go ries “in sti tu tion”, “institutionalization”, “in sti tu tional chan -
ges”, as well as most key so cio log i cal terms, do not have strict and sim ple 
mean ings in con tem po rary so cio log i cal the ory. Their in ter pre ta tion
great ly de pends on the so ci ol o gist’s the o ret i cal ori en ta tions and time-
 serv ing tasks to be solved. There fore in or der to sub stan ti ate the the o ret -
i cal grounds cho sen for dis cus sion of post-so viet institutionalization,
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pp. 5–22.
we would like to pres ent some pre lim i nary re marks re flect ing on the one
hand the au thors’ un der stand ing of in sti tu tional struc tures and pro -
cesses and on the other hand the spe cific char ac ter of so cial changes
tak ing place in the trans form ing post-so viet so ci ety. 
If we talk about our un der stand ing of “in sti tu tional” terms in so cial
sci ences, then, with out in sist ing on the fol low ing rather hy per tro phied
state ment that so cio log i cal the ory can be de fined as an at tempt to ex -
plain institutionalization and deinstitutionalization pro cesses [22], we
can say that on the whole we share the tra di tional ideas of the so cial in te -
gra tion and so cial or der stud ies which mostly pay at ten tion to so cial in -
sti tu tion for ma tion, func tion ing, in ter com mu ni ca tion and changes. He -
re with we mean so cial in sti tu tions as well-or dered and rel a tively steady
so cial for ma tions, in clud ing the so cial bod ies fol low ing of fi cially or con -
ven tion ally adopted reg u la tions and con trol so cial be hav ior in cer tain
spheres of pub lic life by forced or vol un tarily con sent of most so ci ety
mem bers to the cur rent so cial or ga ni za tions and reg u la tions.
Ac cord ing to such un der stand ing of so cial in sti tu tions, in sti tu tiona -
lization should be de fined as for ma tion of new so cial in sti tu tions in
three as pects: 1) for ma tion and ac cep tance of new so cial reg u la tions
(laws, nor ma tive struc tures, tra di tions and rit u als) by so ci ety; 2) cre -
ation of or ga ni za tional struc tures re spon si ble for ar tic u la tion and con -
trol over cur rent reg u la tions and form ing so cial in fra struc ture of in sti -
tu tion al ized be hav ior; 3) for ma tion of mass sub jects’ at ti tude to so cial
reg u la tions and or ga ni za tional struc tures re flect ing that peo ple con sent 
to the cur rent in sti tu tional or der. Ac cord ingly, deinstitutionalization is
the de struc tion of in sti tu tional for ma tions, change in so cial reg u la tions
and clearly ex pressed (or la tent) re jec tion of in sti tu tional re quire ments
for so cial be hav ior.
Ac cept ing the tra di tional “sec tor ap proach” to clas si fi ca tion of so cial
in sti tu tions, which dif fer en ti ates in sti tu tions in ac cor dance with spe -
cific spheres of so cial life, we are go ing to dis cuss deinstitutionalization
and for ma tion of new so cial in sti tu tions in po lit i cal, eco nom i cal and
socio-cul tural spheres, in clud ing the in sti tu tions re spon si ble for hu -
man re pro duc tion and de vel op ment in so cial cul ture (fam ily, med i cine,
ed u ca tion, re li gion, sci ence etc.). 
By link ing pro cesses of rad i cal so cial trans for ma tions (in clud ing the
post-so viet trans for ma tion of so ci ety) to deinstitutionalization and for -
ma tion of new so cial in sti tu tions, we want to stress that the de struc tion
of in sti tu tional grounds of so cial life, in some of the above-men tioned
sec tors, cre ates pre con di tions of so cial cri sis and threat ens the so ci e -
ty — its abil ity to sat isfy the vi tally im por tant so cial needs. For ex am ple,
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the to tal po lit i cal deinstitutionalization leads to po lit i cal shock, civil
con flicts, an ar chy and even tu ally to au thor i tar ian or to tal i tar ian po lit i -
cal reinstitutionalization. De struc tion of eco nomic in sti tu tions deals
with deep socio-eco nomic cri sis, fall in level and qual ity of life, eco nomic
chaos. As a rule, rad i cal trans for ma tions of socio-cul tural in sti tu tions
are caused by po lit i cal rev o lu tions, when the re gimes, seized power, set
in sti tu tional pro hi bi tions and in no va tions. In all cases of rad i cal de -
institutionalization, so ci et ies suf fer from se ri ous shocks and deal with
con sid er able losses re lated to re duc tion or frag men ta tion of in sti tu -
tional space. The “in sti tu tional la cu nas”, formed as the re sult, be come
places of the mass so cial ag gres sion, cyn i cism, anomical de mor al iza -
tion, po lit i cal dem a gogy and thought less conformism. 
Un like the rad i cal deinstitutionalization, which causes so cial shocks 
and ca tas tro phes, grad ual changes in so cial in sti tu tions are the nec es -
sary con di tions for so ci etal de vel op ment ac cord ing to in ner and ex ter nal 
fac tors de ter min ing the ne ces sity of so cial trans for ma tions. Al though
mod er ate deinstitutionalization is al ways re lated to an omic ten den cies
and prob lems of so cial in te gra tion, as a rule, they could be solved with -
out so cial cat a clysms due to grad ual re place ment of old in sti tu tions by
new ones. These mech a nisms were de scribed in the con cepts, like “in sti -
tu tional eva sions” [16], “coun ter-in sti tu tional val ues” [3], “institutio na -
li zation of con flict”, “so ci etal trans for ma tion with ris ing ac tu al iza tion of
noninstitutional phe nom ena” [15], “change of sym bolic uni ver sals” [2],
“mi cro-to-macro tran si tional pro cess” [6], “self-con struc tion in con di -
tions of in sti tu tion al ized plu ral ism” [1]. As a rule, the re search ers who
study so cial in sti tu tions pay their at ten tion to his toric char ac ter, tra di -
tional char ac ter, con ti nu ity of in sti tu tion ally con trolled so cial or der and
so cial in sti tutes [24], while the pro cess of in sti tu tion re place ment is re -
garded as grad ual re con struc tion. This might be the rea son why so ci ol o -
gists can nor to ex plain nei ther to fore tell the ex plo sive pro cesses of
deinstitutionalization. Var i ous ap proaches to the rad i cal dein sti tu tio na -
lization, based on clas si cal the o ries of so cial rev o lu tion un der con tem -
po rary con di tions of so cial de vel op ment, are also un pro duc tive be cause, 
as a rule, past rev o lu tions re sulted not only in re place ment of rul ing re -
gimes and rad i cal in sti tu tional in no va tions but in pow er ful coun ter-rev -
o lu tion ary move ments, which led to civil wars, so cial chaos and in ev i ta -
ble phe nom ena of tri um phant rev o lu tion ary or res to ra tion dic ta tor ship.
Quite dif fer ent sit u a tion can be seen in most cases of con tem po rary
“in sti tu tional ex plo sions” (this term means quick re al iza tion of all- em -
bra c ing in sti tu tional re or ga ni za tion and adop tion of new leg is la tive
grounds of so cial life) re lated to post-com mu nist so ci ety trans for ma -
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tions. So called “vel vet rev o lu tions”, post-com mu nist trans for ma tions,
held in coun tries of Cen tral and East Eu rope, dis played a pos si bil ity of
ex tremely quick, in his tor i cal time, rad i cal changes in in sti tu tional sys -
tem with out the to tal so cial destabilization in her ent to such pro cesses
in the past. Al though in some post-so viet states, there were out breaks of
po lit i cal vi o la tion and in sta bil ity, in a whole, the post-com mu nist trans -
for ma tions of the past de cade were less destabilizing than one could ex -
pect tak ing into ac count how ex plo sively these states aban doned in sti -
tu tional grounds of their so cial lives. 
The “vel vet” na ture of post-com mu nist deinstitutionalization pro mo -
ted the con cepts, like “the end of his tory”, au thor of which, how ever, was
forced to cor rect es sen tially his prog no ses about Clio’s fate, her death
was an nounced pre ma turely [7]. This hap pened be cause that ex pe ri -
ence of post-com mu nist states does not re flect the global civ i li za tion de -
vel op ment ten dency but only the unique his tor i cal phe nom e non, an ex -
pla na tion of which (Ukrai nian so ci ety was taken as an ex am ple) is pre -
sented in this work; the em pir i cal base of post-so viet institutionalization 
anal y sis was formed of the re sults of so cio log i cal mon i tor ing study ing
the dy nam ics of Ukrai nian so ci ety; the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of the NAS
of Ukraine con ducts this mon i tor ing for many years (1992–2001). (In or -
der to carry out the em pir i cal part of mon i tor ing, the au thors se lected a
re p re sen ta tive sam ple of the adult Ukrai nian pop u la tion (N.Pa nina,
M.Chu rylov). The sam ple is note wor thy be cause ad di tional poll ing
places in clude re spon dents in ev ery Ukrai nian oblast (pro por tional to
the num ber of in hab it ants in each oblast), Cri mea, and the city of Kyiv.
The se lec tion quota re flects the spe cific re gional dis tri bu tion of ba sic
socio-de mo graphic char ac ter is tics (sex, age, ed u ca tion). Each oblast
was rep re sented by cen tral city, town and vil lage (also cor re spond ing to
cer tain pro por tions).To en sure a rep re sen ta tive sam ple se lec tion within
the quota, and to achieve ran dom ness, the search for re spon dents was
car ried out by in ter view ers fol low ing a pre vi ously as signed route and
main tain ing quota char ac ter is tics (the in ter viewer gave ques tion naires
only to those re spon dents who cor re sponded to nec es sary quota fea -
tures). The adult pop u la tion (over 17 years old) of Ukraine con sti tuted
the gen eral ag gre gate. The to tal num ber of re spon dents was 1800. The
polls were con ducted by the method of hand out ques tion naires (re spon -
dents filled the ques tion naires by them selves). We used the na tional
poll ing net work of the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy and the Socis Com pany.)
An a lyzing the prob lem, we be gin from the state ment, fun da men tal for 
so cio log i cal sci ence, which says that so cial in te gra tion, so cial or der and
even ex is tence of socium would be im pos si ble with out ba sic so cial in sti -
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tu tions in po lit i cal, eco nomic and so cial spheres. Even if these in sti tu -
tions are for mally con sti tuted — the cor re spond ing for ma tions and laws
are adopted and ex ist — the to tal un will ing ness to live ac cord ing to these
laws and dis trust in in sti tu tional for ma tions in ev i ta bly lead to de struc -
tion of the cur rent so cial or der, crit i cally high so cial in sta bil ity, socio-po -
lit i cal con fron ta tion, col lapse of econ omy, so cial dis or ders and a new “in -
sti tu tional over turn”. These prog no ses fol low from clas si cal so cio log i cal
the o ries on so cial changes and so cial rev o lu tions. Let us dis cuss the sit -
u a tion in Ukrai nian so ci ety af ter the USSR col lapsed and a new in de -
pend ent state was es tab lished. There oc curred some very spe cific
changes in all sec tors of the in sti tu tional space af ter Ukrai nian in de -
pend ence was de clared in 1991.
Hy poth e ses on the Na ture of Post-So viet
Deinstitutionalization 
The em pir i cal fact that the so viet so ci ety in sti tu tional base col lapsed,
as a re sult of the USSR col lapse and cor re spond ing po lit i cal, eco nomic
and socio-cul tural changes, can hardly be dis puted within the frame -
works of con tem po rary so cio log i cal ap proaches to the in sti tu tional phe -
nom e non. It would be suf fi cient to re mem ber the super-state col lapse,
lost dom i na tion of com mu nist ide ol ogy and one-party in sti tu tion, lost
mo nop oly of state prop erty in sti tu tion, lost odi ous to tal i tar ian in sti tu -
tions in the spir i tual life sphere, like cen sor ship, athe is tic ed u ca tion and 
etc. It is dif fi cult to find at least one so cial in sti tu tion, which was not fully 
or par tially blasted as a re sult of the post-so viet trans for ma tions. The
prin ci pal changes con cern all in sti tu tions un less the fam ily one. In this
sit u a tion, the threat that so cial life will be to tally destabilized and bring
about so cial chaos be comes a re al ity, as far as in sti tu tional grounds of
so cial or der were prac ti cally ru ined. How ever, in some post-so viet states
(fore most in Ukraine), such rad i cal deinstitutionalization did not lead
ei ther to so cial chaos (“bella om nium con tra omnes”) or to dra matic so -
cial in sta bil ity re lated to ag gres sive home-pol icy con flicts. In Ukraine,
there were not ob served even tra di tional (for such cases) ag gra va tion of
so cial-class and interethnic re la tions. More over, mon i tor ing of so cial-
 class and eth nic tol er ance in Ukrai nian so ci ety, con ducted for many
years, showed that in Ukraine the so cial mech a nism typ i cal for the
states and so ci et ies, which found them selves in cri sis, failed: wors en ing
socio-eco nomic sit u a tion and so cial well-be ing of pop u la tion did not
cause ris ing so cial in tol er ance and eth nic dis crim i na tion [18]. In our
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opin ion, due to that, Ukraine pre sented a mech a nism of good pros pects
for the hu man civ i li za tion, ca pa ble of main tain ing so cial sta bil ity un der
con di tions of per ma nently deep en ing socio-eco nomic cri sis. The re mar -
k able fact is that even such a pow er ful so cial splash of pro test ac tiv ity,
re lated to the “cas sette scan dal”, which in volved all po lit i cal in tel lec tual
Ukrai nian elite, did not bring about any es sen tial destabilization of
socio-eco nomic sit u a tion, which be gan to im prove for namely the past
two years, and this im prove ment caused a rise in so cial well-be ing of
pop u la tion [9].
The fol low ing two hy poth e ses could be re garded in or der to ex plain
these so cial phe nom ena from the in sti tu tional the ory point of view: 1) the
deinstitutionalization was only dem on stra tive and did not af fect the deep
bases of in sti tu tional or der, that is why old in sti tu tions pre served their
reg u la tive func tions in new so cial con di tions; 2) for ma tion of new so cial
in sti tu tions was as rapid as ru in ing of old ones, so the new in sti tu tions
were able to per form the com pen sate in te grat ing and sta bi liz ing func tion. 
 First hy poth e sis looks like more so cio log i cal fan ta sies than the so -
cial re al ity. Al though, some el e ments of “in sti tu tional mim icry” can be
reg is tered for new so cial in sti tu tions (for ex am ple, the state prop erty in -
sti tu tion has been partly re pro duced in the in cor po rated pri vat iza tion
sys tem, the pres i den tial power in sti tu tion mostly re pro duces the old
sys tem of one-party man age ment, and the party priv i lege in sti tu tion
changes into a priv i lege sys tem for the dem o crat i cally elected power),
nev er the less, these signs of in sti tu tional re gen er a tion can not be de ci -
sive if we as sess whether the old in sti tu tions are still ca pa ble of con trol -
ling so cial re la tions and so cial be hav ior. The de ci sive ar gu ment is that
in dis put able fact that old so cial in sti tu tions are be ing ru ined “from
above” — with the help of leg is la tion and fur ther re or ga ni za tion of in sti -
tu tional grounds. What ever eco nom i cally in ef fi cient pri vat iza tion of
state prop erty was for its first years, it was based on laws, which ex -
cluded state mo nop oly on prop erty in pro duc tion and trade sec tors.
What ever spir i tu ally close to the so viet party power the in sti tu tion of ex -
ec u tive power was in the post-so viet states, its pow ers, leg is la tively de -
ter mined, and the way of its func tion ing (based on dem o cratic elec tions)
es sen tially dif fer from the one-party power in sti tu tion. So, we can state
with con fi dence that as a re sult of the post-com mu nist trans for ma tion,
the old so cial in sti tu tions, which pro vided cer tain so cial sta bil ity and
so ci ety in teg rity, lost at least two of three in sti tu tional at trib utes — le gal -
ity and or ga ni za tional in fra struc ture. And so far, the hy poth e sis on pos -
si ble pres er va tion of old in sti tu tions un der new so cial con di tions would
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be hardly ap pro pri ate for ex pla na tions of so cial sta bil ity in Ukrai nian
so ci ety of the post-so viet trans for ma tion pe riod. 
Carrying out this anal y sis, we are go ing to orig i nate from the fact that
so cial in sti tu tions can have var i ous sta tus in so ci ety as to le gal ity and le -
git i macy cri te ria, and cor re spond ingly they can af fect dif fer ently so cial
in te gra tion and so cial or der de vel op ment. This state ment was ex pressed 
clearly enough by W.Buckley: “If we are go ing to use the term “in sti tu -
tion”, it ap pears that we must be pre pared to dis tin guish “le gal ized” from 
“le git i mized” in sti tu tions, and “le git i mized” from “nonlegitimized” in sti -
tu tions; so cial power from le git i mized au thor ity, and util i tar ian or co er -
cive com pli ance from nor ma tive con for mity and value con sen sus” [4,
p.167]. This un der stand ing of so cial in sti tu tions im plies con sid er ation
of sev eral types of in sti tu tional for ma tions with var i ous af fect on in te -
gra tion pro cesses and so cial sta bil ity in so ci ety. Among them, only those
hav ing all in sti tu tional at trib utes — le gal ity, le git i mate and in sti tu tional
in fra struc ture — can be rec og nized as of to tally in te gra tive and sta bi liz -
ing po ten tial.
With out le gal sta tus and or ga ni za tional in fra struc ture, old so cial in -
sti tu tions ex ist only within the frame works of tra di tional con ven tional
norms and ste reo types of mass con scious ness re lated to the so viet tra di -
tion when peo ple con sented to those norms of so cial re la tions and be ha v -
ior. There fore, in the cur rent con di tions, pres er va tion of so viet in sti tu -
tional sys tem can be re garded only in the tra di tional le git i macy con text,
which is ev i dent due to still ex ist ing state pa ter nal ism in sti tu tion, es sen -
tial in flu ence of com mu nist par ties on po lit i cal life of post-so viet so ci ety,
dom i nance of “pseudoprivatized” (as if in cor po rated) en ter prises in pro -
duc tion struc ture and etc. Tra di tional le git i macy could be enough for ac k -
nowl edge ment that old so cial in sti tu tions still af fect so cial re la tions and
peo ple’s be hav ior, how ever, it is in suf fi cient for ex pla na tion of so cial sta -
bil ity and in te gra tion in Ukrai nian so ci ety. Quite the con trary, the re sid -
ual in flu ence of in sti tu tional norms, il le gal and con flict ing with the aims
de clared by the state, can bring about destabilization and col lapse — can
cause pro test against new le gal so cial in sti tu tions. Such man i fes ta tions
of so cial pro test, based on “norms of so viet con duct”, were reg is tered in
Rus sia in Oc to ber 1993 and in Ukraine (with con sid er ably less vi o la tion),
the lat ter were re flected in the mass pro test votes for Ukrai nian com mu -
nist party dur ing Par lia men tary and Pres i den tial elec tions. 
 Sec ond hy poth e sis is that, for a short pe riod of time, new so cial in -
sti tu tions gained the nec es sary at trib u tive qual i ties for per form ing in te -
gra tive and sta bi liz ing func tions — this can be some how ex plained by
their le gal sta tus and pres ence of new in sti tu tional in fra struc ture for -
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mally sup port ing the reg u la tive func tion per for mance. The first rea son -
able ques tion would be how is it pos si ble such a sud den emer gence of
prin ci pally new and ef fec tive so cial in sti tu tions? Clas si cal the ory of so -
cial in sti tu tions says that this is im pos si ble be cause in sti tu tions can not 
be born as “Aph ro dite from the sea spume”. In or der to in sti tu tion al ize a
role struc ture and nor ma tive sys tem, a long evolutional pe riod of time is
needed. We can sup pose that new so cial in sti tu tions were grad u ally
form ing in side the so viet in sti tu tional sys tem and when the in de pend -
ent states of CIS got formed these in sti tu tions got their le gal sta tus.
There are se ri ous grounds for such an idea. As it was men tioned above,
as a re sult “of so cial mim icry”, some old so cial in sti tu tions pre served
their dom i nance and still per form their func tions in new so cial con di -
tions. In stead of their de gen er a tion, as it could be ex pected, we can ob -
serve some thing like their re gen er a tion, in other words, “re in car na tion”.
Thanks to this, the so cial struc ture of the post-so viet so ci ety pre served
many sta tus and role po si tions for so cial ac tors, who oc cu pied sim i lar
po si tions in the past. For ex am ple, in the new state struc tures, old no -
men cla ture placed it self prac ti cally with out any ma te rial, socio-sta tus
and moral losses. New in sti tu tions also did not emerge out of no where as 
far as in the so viet past some shady so cial in sti tu tions were born, and
they had some spe cific le git i macy — they per formed their func tions and
de vel oped out side the le gal field but had the mass sup port as com pen -
sate reg u la tors for “nat u ral” hu man and busi ness re la tions un der con -
di tions of ar ti fi cially le gal and ideo log i cal lim i ta tions of to tal i tar ian sys -
tem. So the so viet in sti tu tions of uni ver sal pro tec tion ism and “shady
econ omy” could quickly bring out, with the help of le gal iza tion, in sti tu -
tions of pri vate prop erty and en tre pre neur ship.
This so cial phe nom e non was stud ied by rep re sen ta tives of “neo in -
stitutional ap proach”, who, in their re searches on so cial changes, pay
their fore most at ten tion to in sti tu tional suc ces sion, grow ing “in sti tu -
tional space” and who are against the in ter pre ta tion of quick so cial
changes as breaks in suc ces sion of in sti tu tional de vel op ment; in par tic -
u lar, they stated that in the USSR for a long time there ex isted the in sti -
tu tion of “ad min is tra tive mar ket”, which ar ranged tran si tion to mar ket
econ omy [26].
How ever, the only le gal iza tion of “shadow in sti tu tions” is ob vi ously
in suf fi cient for their trans for ma tion into prin ci pally new ef fec tive in sti -
tu tions, cor re spond ing to the new de clared aims for the state and so ci ety 
de vel op ment. It is not enough to le git i mate “plun der ing of state prop erty” 
in the way of pri vat iza tion or “shadow econ omy” in the way of en tre pre -
neur ship, if you want these in sti tu tions to gain le git i mized sta tus in so -
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ci ety and peo ple to ex press their con sent to liv ing in ac cor dance with
these norms and reg u la tions and not as par tic i pants of “shady side of
so cial life” but as good cit i zens of dem o cratic state. The nonlegitimized
na ture of new po lit i cal and eco nomic in sti tu tions was re vealed no lon ger
af ter they were le gal ized in in de pend ent Ukraine. This fact is con firmed
by the poll ing data on peo ple’s trust in the ba sic so cial in sti tutes; the ex -
tremely low trust rat ing, reg is tered in 1994, still re mains prac ti cally at
the same level (Ta ble 1).
Ta ble 1
So cial In sti tu tions in Ukraine: Trust Rat ing, %*
1994 2000
Trust Dis trust Trust Dis trust
Fam ily and rel a tives 86.9  3.6 93.0  2.7
Your self 89.6  2.4 93.5  2.3
Neigh bors 40.7 20.3 39.0 21.7
Fel low cit i zens 30.2 18.7 30.4 20.6
God 61.2 14.2 68.8 12.5
Col leagues 37.5 15.5 38.7 17.9
Church and clergy 35.6 27.3 38.8 30.0
As trol o gers 16.9 44.7 15.8 51.3
Mass me dia 19.9 36.6 29.1 31.3
Mi li tia 12.8 57.1 12.5 57.0
Com mu nist party 14.5 65.0 16.9 59.2
Na tion al ists  7.4 69.4  6.6 69.3
Su preme Coun cil (par lia ment) 10.1 51.2  7.1 62.3
Armed Forces 38.1 24.1 34.8 26.0
Gov ern ment 11.4 48.8 13.9 49.8
Pres i dent 16.1 52.8 27.1 43.2
Pri vate en tre pre neurs 13.8 43.4 16.7 46.3
Large state en ter prise man ag ers 13.9 42.1 12.4 47.1
Trade un ions (tra di tional) 14.5 47.3 12.5 49.2
New trade un ions  8.8 41.2  6.7 49.1
* In the ta ble, there is no data re flect ing po si tions of those re spon dents who an swered “it is dif fi cult
to say if I trust or not”.
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It is easy to see that cit i zens, who trust in po lit i cal in sti tu tions, are
rather an ex clu sion than a rule. For the past years, the trust rat ing did
not grow, and for some of po si tions, there is even a de cline. The higher
rat ing of trust in the Pres i dent of Ukraine mostly re lates to fact that in
1994 the poll was con ducted just be fore the Pres i den tial elec tion, and in
2000 it took place af ter elec tions. But even trust in the newly elected
Pres i dent is less than dis trust. The real trust was ex pressed by ma jor ity
of Ukrai nian cit i zens only in them selves, their rel a tives and God. 
The char ac ter is tic fea tures of the moral-psy cho log i cal at mo sphere,
which arose for this pe riod, are mass de mor al iza tion, to tal dis ap point -
ment in so cial ide als and a great deal of so cial cyn i cism. To il lus trate the
lat ter, we pres ent the poll ing data of 2000, where we had a se ries of po si -
tions (of tests on so cial cyn i cism and an omic de mor al iza tion) re flect ing
peo ple’s opin ions about the very pos si bil ity to be lieve in some thing or to
trust in some body in Ukrai nian so ci ety (Ta ble 2). 
Ta ble 2
At ti tude of Ukrai nian Cit i zens to Judge ments




Un der the cur rent dis or der and vague ness,
it is dif fi cult to un der stand in what you
should be lieve
78.5 14.6 6.9
Now the prob lem is that most peo ple do not
be lieve in any thing 87.9 7.3 4.8
Dis trust in any body is the saf est 52.0 31.7 16.4
Most peo ple can not be trusted 34.5 46.2 19.3
In the past, peo ple felt better be cause ev ery -
body knew how to act in the right way 72.1 15.8 12.1
If you judge on peo ple’s agree ment or dis agree ment on the above-
 men tioned state ments, then the moral-psy cho log i cal at mo sphere in Uk -
rai nian so ci ety looks ex tremely op pres sive. How ever, it can not be other
now, if we take into ac count the cur rent con di tion of in sti tu tional sys -
tem, when old in sti tu tions al ready lost reg u la tive func tions and the new
ones have not been formed yet. This can be con firmed by the data on dis -
trust in old and new in sti tu tions (for ex am ple, most Ukrai nian cit i zens
equally dis trust in large state en ter prise man ag ers and in pri vate en tre -
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pre neurs, in old and new trade un ions, in com mu nist party and the mul -
ti party in sti tu tion). In this sit u a tion, the pri or ity goes to the tem po ral
situative norms deal ing with the ne ces sity of sur vival “here” and “now”.
Namely this situative na ture, tem po ral ity and in sta bil ity of so cial po si -
tion take away peo ple’s trust in so ci ety and their faith in so cial jus tice.
How ever, this dis trust is not strong, as not strong is the tran si tional
so ci ety that caused it. Even in the past when, ac cord ing to the three forth 
of Ukrai nian cit i zens, “peo ple felt better be cause ev ery body knew how to
act in the right way”, not many peo ple sin cerely be lieved that ev ery thing
was be ing done in the right way. Al though ev ery one knew for what the to -
tal i tar ian sys tem would en cour age them, and for what it would pun ish.
It was the “im moral def i nite ness” at mo sphere, where it was enough to
adopt be hav ior reg u la tions once for all, and you needed any more to solve 
daily “Ham let’s prob lems”. In other words, peo ple fully trusted in power,
in its abil ity to pun ish ev ery body, who would show their dis trust or give
up pub licly their faith in com mu nist ide als. As far as this trust was
amoral, most cit i zens of the USSR rather eas ily re nounced their state, its 
ide ol ogy and its moral norms. The cur rent nos tal gia is un der stand able if 
we take into ac count that most peo ple can not live psy cho log i cally with -
out some so cial def i nite ness, faith and trust. 
In these con di tions, the main com pen sate func tion is per formed by
two fac tors al low ing peo ple to keep def i nite psy cho log i cal sta bil ity and
feel some pros pects: peo ple trust in them selves and in their rel a tives. For 
over whelm ing ma jor ity of Ukrai nian cit i zen, nom i nally peo ple them -
selves to gether with the friends and rel a tives clos est to them are their so -
cial-psy cho log i cal re sources for phys i cal, spir i tual and moral sur vival
un der con di tions of socio-eco nomic cri sis and to tal an o mie. The sec ond
fac tor re lates to still ex ist ing hopes for the fu ture. And we talk not about
the near est pros pects, which most Ukrai ni ans eval u ate very scep ti cally. 
Ac cord ing to the data of the poll con ducted by Socis com pany in the
fall 1998 (1200 re spon dents made up the sam ple rep re sen ta tive of the
to tal adult Ukrai nian pop u la tion), only 17% of Ukrai nian cit i zens ex -
pressed the hope that “the cur rent hard ships in econ omy and so cial life”
would con tinue for less than 5 years. How ever, the more re mote per spec -
tive the higher peo ple’s hopes. An swering the ques tion “If you think over
the sit u a tion in our so ci ety, how will you eval u ate per spec tives of its
change in the fu ture?”, 45% ex pressed their hopes of grad ual pos i tive
changes in so cial sit u a tion and only 22% were as sured that the cur rent
sit u a tion would be come worse.
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These hopes are mostly based on the mass idea that Ukraine will
evolve in the same di rec tion as de vel oped dem o cratic coun tries, for
which the cur rent hard ships of Ukrai nian so ci ety are the prob lems left
in the past. As to the most Ukrai nian peo ple’s opin ions, the so-called
west ern socio-eco nomic model should be the ref er ence-point for the fur -
ther state and so ci ety de vel op ment. Eval u ating de vel op ment per spec -
tives for the hu man civ i li za tion and their own state in the 21st cen tury,
Ukrai ni ans ex pressed dif fer ent opin ions: op ti mis tic, neu tral and pes si -
mis tic. How ever, for some po si tions, op ti mis tic eval u a tions were more
fre quent ly ex pressed about Ukraine than about the world as a whole (Ta -
ble 3). 
Ta ble 3
At ti tudes of Ukrai nian Pop u la tion to 
So cial Changes in the World and Ukraine in the 21st Cen tury
(ac cord ing to the poll ing data of Jan u ary 2000), %*
In the 21st cen tury there will be:
In the world In Ukraine
less more less more
Starv ing peo ple 31.7 32.6 35.1 38.0
Vic tims of armed con flicts 25.8 33.8 37.1 15.1
Healthy peo ple 46.2 26.1 46.6 28.9
Ter ror ist at tacks 24.2 31.8 33.2 17.8
Eco log i cal ca tas tro phes 22.8 36.1 28.9 27.5
Out stand ing sci en tific dis cov er ies  8.5 46.6 13.1 42.3
Na tional in tol er ance 26.1 18.9 32.2 15.2
Cor rup tion (brib ery) 21.3 40.4 24.7 42.1
Crises in econ omy 25.1 33.6 28.8 36.1
Just happy peo ple 29.8 32.9 32.1 33.9
* In the ta ble, there is no data, re flect ing po si tions of the re spon dents, who an swered “there will be
as many (much) as now”.
As one can see, for their own coun try, Ukrai ni ans see per spec tives
more op ti mis tic than for the world ac cord ing to the fol low ing po si tions:
ter ror ism, armed con flicts, eco log i cal ca tas tro phes, na tional in tol er an -
ce. There are some po si tions where pes si mis tic eval u a tions are dom i -
nant (they are al most the same for Ukraine and for the world) — health,
eco nomic cri ses, cor rup tion. The very sig nif i cant dom i nance of op ti mis -
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tic eval u a tions was reg is tered only for one po si tion — out stand ing sci en -
tific dis cov er ies in the world and Ukraine. In a whole, the hopes of prog -
ress in Ukraine are sim i lar to the hopes of hu man civ i li za tion de vel op -
ment. Al though in some cases pes si mis tic eval u a tions were more fre -
quent than op ti mis tic ones, they re late to the fu ture of Ukraine in the
same mea sure as to the fu ture of man kind. 
As we see, the in sti tu tional space of Ukrai nian so ci ety is ex tremely
con tra dic tory and in ex pli ca ble for the both hy poth e ses pre sented above. 
On the one hand, most so ci ety mem bers dis trust in old and new in sti tu -
tions and feel an omic de mor al iza tion, on the other hand, they keep so -
cial self-con trol, tol er ance and faith in so ci ety de vel op ment pros pects
within the gen eral course of civ i li za tion pro cess. What so cial mech a -
nisms can cause such a con tra dic tory pic ture? If new in sti tu tions are
still not le git i mized and old in sti tu tions are not le gal any more, then
which in sti tu tional for ma tions can per form suf fi ciently ef fec tive reg u la -
tive, in te gra tive and sta bi liz ing func tions? In or der to an swer this ques -
tion, we need to dis cuss the spe cific and in many re spects unique na ture
of the post-so viet institutionalization.
Dou ble So ci ety Institutionalization Phe nom e non
in Post-So viet Ukraine
There are some bases for dis cuss ing the unique na ture of post-so viet
institutionalization. The same so cial trans for ma tions have been reg is -
tered in the whole post-com mu nist world, how ever, we think, that the
post-com mu nist trans for ma tions of so cial in sti tu tions in the coun tries
of for mer “so cial is tic camp” dif fer from the post-so viet ones. Al though
Pol ish so ci ol o gists stress that “the col lapse of com mu nist re gimes in
East ern Eu rope led to the dra matic trans for ma tion of po lit i cal and eco -
nom i cal in sti tu tions” [21, p. 183], in Pol ish so ci ety, there were al ready le -
gal and le git i mate new in sti tu tions at the very be gin ning of trans for ma -
tions — mar ket econ omy, “Sol i dar ity”, cath o lic church [20]. Be sides,
only in the post-so viet con di tions, there ap peared the phe nom e non of to -
tal cor rup tion that un der mined le git i mi za tion of new so cial in sti tu tions. 
This phe nom e non was de scribed by Rus sian so ci ol o gists: “In the
post-so viet sit u a tion, the ru in ing au thor i tar ian nor ma tive struc tures
cre ated the sit u a tion of cor rup tion in all value-nor ma tive so ci ety sys -
tems of var i ous lev els (in clud ing the per sonal level); and this sit u a tion is
as se ri ous and dan ger ous as the widely dis cussed cor rup tion in eco -
nomic and po lit i cal sys tems” [13, p. 512]. In Ukraine, this phe nom e non
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is re flected in the mass con scious ness as a strong be lief that, among all
other so cial groups in the new state de vel op ment, the lead ing role is
played by Ma fia [18]. 
Lastly, only in the post-so viet states of the whole post-com mu nist
world (apart from Bal tic coun tries), all gen er a tions had al most no ex pe -
ri ence of so cial life un der po lit i cal de moc racy and mar ket econ omy.
There fore the so cial in te gra tion and sta bil ity, main tained in Po land,
Hun gary, Czech Re pub lic and other coun tries of “late communization”,
have other in sti tu tional foun da tions than in Rus sia and Ukraine, which
made it pos si ble for them to per form quick and ef fec tive “shock ther apy”
and achieve pos i tive socio-eco nomic re sults, while econ o mies of post-
 so viet states col lapsed and po lit i cal life was char ac ter ised by the res to -
ra tion pro cesses that de vel oped rap idly. Nev er the less, even in these con -
di tions, Ukrai nian so ci ety avoided the “sec ond com ing” of com mu nist
Mes siah and ag gres sive so cial con flicts. In our opin ion, this can be ex -
plained with the help of the hy poth e sis on spe cific na ture of in sti tu tional 
pro cesses, which could be brought to the fol low ing key state ments:
1) af ter they lost their le gal ity as a re sult of peres troika and col lapse
of the USSR, the ba sic in sti tu tions did not lose their tra di tional le -
git i macy — peo ple still con sent to so cial reg u la tions based on ide -
ol ogy of state pa ter nal ism, on the fact that large en ter prises be long 
to the state prop erty, on so cial ist priv i leges for pop u la tion and spe -
cial priv i leges for rul ing elite, on the same state con trol of so cial
sphere — ed u ca tion, health care, sci ence, art cul ture, con trol over
con fes sional and interethnic re la tions;
2) il le gal (shadow) in sti tu tions of so viet so ci ety — shady mar ket (“un -
der-the-coun ter” pro duc tion and spec u la tion while there are shor t -
ages), pro tec tion and cor rup tion, crim i nal Ma fia, dou ble moral
norms (dif fer ent pub lic and pri vate moral po si tions) — were trans -
formed into le gal in sti tu tions of “tran si tional so ci ety”, but did not
gain the proper legitimity be cause peo ple think that they are of “le -
git i mized law less ness”; that is why peo ple re fuse to live ac cord ing to
the for mally le gal ized but still “shady” reg u la tions and to ac cept
new in sti tu tions as ba sic in sti tu tional in fra struc ture of so ci ety; 
3) ex pe ri enc ing de mor ali sa tion, dis trust and dis sat is fac tion with
their po si tion in so ci ety, most Ukrai nian cit i zens are of am biv a lent
con cern to in sti tu tional for ma tions, leg acy or le git i macy of which
is not sup ported by laws or moral norms; this am biv a lence re veals
in the mass con sent to liv ing in such an in sti tu tional space, where
le gal ity is pro vided by the only le git i mized ex is tence of new in sti tu -
tions, and legitimity is pro vided by still ex ist ing mimicrized old in -
Post-So viet Deinstitutionalization and For ma tion of New So cial In sti tu tions in Ukraine
Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2000–2001 25
sti tu tions, which keep per form ing tra di tional reg u la tive func tions
and sup ported by el e ments of old so cial in fra struc ture, old so cial
po si tions and role di rec tives. 
So, only this dou ble institutionalization en sures the orig i nal in sti tu -
tional strength of Ukrai nian so ci ety based on peo ple’s con sent to liv ing in
such an in sti tu tional space, where old and new in sti tu tions work to -
gether, pro vid ing, with the help of their con tra dic tory co ex is tence, all in sti -
tu tional at trib utes nec es sary for so cial in te gra tion and sta bil ity. 
Let us see how these ab stract reg u la tions are re al ized in so cial prac -
tice. We start with the ex am ples of the dou ble institutionalization phe -
nom ena. It is known that, in the so viet so ci ety, health care and ed u ca tion 
in sti tu tions were con trolled by the state with the nec es sary le gal and le -
git i mate at trib utes. In the shady in sti tu tional space, there ex isted il le gal
med i cal and pri vate tu tor prac tice. In new so cial con di tions, the state in -
sti tu tions of free med i cal ser vices and ed u ca tion ex ist as le gal and prac -
ti cally fully re pro duce the old so viet in fra struc ture. Not only or ga ni za -
tions are still the same, but staff po si tions, sta tus po si tions and roles,
which all to gether form these in sti tu tions. In spite of this, the were le gal -
ized pri vate clin ics and ed u ca tional in sti tu tions, which should (ide ally)
com pete with the state ones and raise qual ity of ed u ca tion and health
care. How ever, in the con di tions of to tal cor rup tion, pri vate med i cine
par a sit izes on the state in fra struc ture, and in most cases med i cal staff
play two roles si mul ta neously — they are un self ish state white col lars
with low sal a ries and spe cial ists pro vid ing ex pen sive pri vate ser vices on
ac count of low er ing qual ity of free med i cal care. The same two roles are
played by school teach ers, which, on the one hand, get mis ery sal a ries
and pro vide free ed u ca tion at state schools, and on the other hand, they
per ma nently make a deal with par ents about con tri bu tion for good re -
sults of their chil dren. The dou ble institutionalization par a dox means
that, be ing pa tients and par ents, most Ukrai nian cit i zens ac cept this in -
sti tu tional sys tem as in ev i ta ble evil, in other words, as not the worst grief 
be cause they have some free dom for mak ing de ci sions in this con tra dic -
tory in sti tu tional space. Dou ble roles — of elected rep re sen ta tives of
peo ple and ac tive busi ness men — are played by the dep u ties of all of lev -
els, be cause power in sti tu tions and pri vate en ter prises formed some -
thing that we can call, with the help of Inglehart’s term, “sym bi otic in ter -
de pen dence” [12]. Such in ter de pen dence is char ac ter is tic of prac ti cally
all in sti tu tional for ma tions, so, in ev ery in sti tu tional sec tor, Ukrai nian
cit i zens ex pe ri ence this dou ble in sti tu tional pres sure and look for the
at trib utes of le gal ity and legitimity that are nec es sary for so cial con sent.
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We are not go ing to limit grounds for the hy poth e sis to il lus tra tive ma -
te rial only, nev er the less, we re gard it in ac cor dance with two cri te ria ca -
pa ble of con firm ing or re fut ing the dou ble institutionalization idea. The
first cri te rion is how in sti tu tional pro cesses cor re spond to the mass con -
scious ness in Ukraine. This means that du al ity of in sti tu tional reg u la -
tions should be re flected in the dom i nant psy cho-am biv a lent at ti tude of
peo ple to in sti tu tional bases of so cial life. The mass am biv a lence phe -
nom e non in Ukrai nian so ci ety was de scribed by us ear lier [8]. Here let us 
say that it has not changed for the whole mon i tor ing pe riod. One of most
gen eral ex am ples of am biv a lent at ti tude to in sti tu tional bases of so ci ety
(old or new) is du al ity of two dif fer ent so cial sys tems, the names of which
re flect the prin ci pal in sti tu tional op po si tion: cap i tal ism-so cial ism. The
fol low ing data pres ent how Ukrai nian cit i zens an swered the ques tion
about their at ti tude to al ter na tive po lit i cal forces (Ta ble 4).
Ta ble 4
“Po lit i cal forces to day are pres ently di vided into those which want to
re turn to so cial ism and those which want to de velop cap i tal ism.
What is your per sonal at ti tude to wards such forces?”, %
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
I sup port the pro po -
nents of so cial ism 22.1 22.5 20.1 20.9 23.6 23.4 25.5 23.6 
I sup port the pro po -
nents of cap i tal ism 12.7 13.2 13.3 10.8 11.1 10.9 17.1 12.9
I sup port both of
them to avoid con flict 23.7 18.7 17.8 16.9 19.6 20.5 18.0 17.6
I sup port nei ther 20.0 23.8 25.3 26.1 23.5 22.5 20.4 24.2
Other  1.8  2.8  2.0  2.1  2.9  3.2  3.5  3.2
Dif fi cult to say 19.3 19.1 21.6 23.1 19.4 19.2 18.5 18.3
No an swer  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1
 As we see, only one third of re spon dents are ready to sup port one of
two op po site po si tions — “to cap i tal ism” or “go ing back to so cial ism”. Ev -
ery fifth Ukrai nian cit i zen does not have their clear opin ion. The rest ex -
pressed their am biv a lence with ei ther con form or ni hil is tic ori en ta tions.
In so ci ol ogy, the term “am biv a lence” first was used by Mer ton, who re -
garded du al ity and dis crep ancy of per sonal so cial po si tion as a re sult of
so cial an o mie [16]. The spe cific char ac ter of post-to tal i tar ian am biv a -
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lence is re vealed in sev eral as pects: firstly, in the mass and in di vid ual
con scious ness, op po site value-nor ma tive sub sys tems co ex ist not as an -
tag o nists but as co-or di nate el e ments of one con scious ness type and
emo tional at ti tude to so cial re al ity; sec ondly, con tra dic tory value sys -
tems are typ i cal not for dif fer ent so cial groups, when com pe ti tion be -
tween them could even tu ally end in es tab lish ment of hi er ar chi cal sys -
tem, but in fact they are typ i cal for each big so cial group, and thirdly,
 ambivalence re veals it self in con tra dic tory com bi na tions of dem o cratic
goals, which set for so cial trans for ma tions, and to tal i tar ian ways for im -
ple men ta tion of dem o cratic ideas. The bright est revealence of am biv a -
lence could be seen in par al lel per sonal ori en ta tions to wards op po site
val ues and norms. An owner of am biv a lent con scious ness could si mul -
ta neously sup port mar ket econ omy and con trolled prices, sup port ab -
so lute in de pend ence of Ukraine and be against its leav ing the USSR. We
re mem ber the ref er en dum of March 1991 when Ukrai nian pop u la tion
gave their voices to fed er a tion and con fed er a tion at the same time. In so -
cio log i cal re searches, this phe nom e non could be reg is tered when you
ana lyse at ti tudes of the same peo ple to op po site po lit i cal in sti tu tions. 
The am biv a lent type of po lit i cal con scious ness is char ac ter ized by
un crit i cal ac cept ing or re fusal from any po lit i cal al ter na tives. The con -
form-am biv a lent con scious ness thinks that “yes” for cap i tal ism does
not mean “against” re turn ing to so cial ism. The ni hil is tic-am biv a lent
con scious ness re sists any at tempts to take so ci ety out of crit i cal tran si -
tional pe riod. Ukrai nian cit i zens of ni hil is tic ori en ta tion be long to the
most con sid er able part of re spon dents, which to gether with con form ists 
make up 40%. The rest — who have a clear po lit i cal po si tion or found it
dif fi cult to an swer — are not char ac ter ized by such ev i dent am biv a lence
when con tra dic tory po si tions can be seen in one judge ment. And even
though they do not ex press their ob vi ous con tra dic tory po lit i cal po si -
tions, many peo ple suf fer from hid den am biv a lence when they de lib er -
ately de clare cer tain po lit i cal po si tions, while their in ner po si tions (of
which they are of ten un con scious) tend to the op po site ones. This type of
per sonal con scious ness is mo saic-am biv a lent. For a dem o crat i cally ori -
ented per son, their con flict of mo saic con scious ness means con tra dic -
tions be tween dem o cratic ide als and dem o cratic pro cess re al iza tion (its
speed and range). This con flict leads to in ten tion of speed ing up the
dem o cratic ren o va tion by all means, in clud ing those of well mas tered to -
tal i tar ian ar se nal — to fight against all “en e mies of de moc racy”. For con -
vinced con ser va tives-so cial ists, this con flict can be seen in their very
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par a dox i cal ap peals to pro vide them with all dem o cratic free doms,
which are ob vi ously in com pat i ble with their com mu nist be lieves. 
Gen erally speak ing, an am biv a lent per son more cor re sponds to the
tran si tional so ci ety than a per fect pro po nent of dem o cratic so ci ety with
clear, undiscrepant con scious ness and de ter mined at ti tude to wards
dem o cratic norms. In con di tions of the dou ble institutionalization, the
am biv a lent con scious ness is nor mal, it cor re sponds to the am biv a lent
and con tra dic tory in sti tu tional con trol over so cial re la tions and be hav -
iour. So, the mass am biv a lence could be a good ev i dence in or der to prove 
that the dou ble institutionalization phe nom e non ex ist. 
The sec ond cri te rion of the spe cific post-so viet institutionalization
could be grounded on cor re spond ing changes in so cial struc ture. In so -
cio log i cal the o ries, there is a rec og nized state ment that in sti tu tional
changes be come sig nif i cant for so ci ety only when there hap pened the
cor re spond ing changes in so cial struc ture and strat i fi ca tion. The so cio -
log i cal the ory of so cial struc ture trans for ma tions is based on rather long 
mon i tor ing of the west ern so ci ety de vel op ment, where the so cial strat i fi -
ca tion bases and dem o cratic in sti tu tions were de vel oped for cen tu ries
and rev o lu tion ary changes took place when so cial sci ences could not be
even re garded as sci ence. At tempts to sub stan ti ate a ne ces sity of rev o lu -
tion ary at tacks on so cial-class struc ture, made by Marx, brought bit ter
fruits not only to those states, where the found ers of Marx ism of fered
their the o ret i cal and prac ti cal rec om men da tions on rad i cal so ci ety
trans for ma tions. 
The west ern world suc ceeded in avoid ing the se duc tive com mu nist
rec i pes for so ci ety re ha bil i ta tion and could hap pily say that grad ual
changes in so cial struc ture brought about the “di a mond-shaped” model
of so cial strat i fi ca tion, which is nec es sary for civil ised de vel op ment and
in which the tops and bot toms be long to mi nor i ties while the base is
formed by the most nu mer ous mid dle class, in ter ested in pres er va tion
and fur ther de vel op ment of this so cial struc ture. And when the West
goes on with har mo ni sa tion of so cial-class re la tions un der the glob al -
iza tion con di tions, the post-so viet world ex pe ri ences the sec ond (for the
cen tury) rev o lu tion ary crush of so cial struc ture.
The first strat i fi ca tion ex plo sion, re lated to the rad i cal de stroy of ru -
in ing class struc ture, even tu ally brought about a di vi sion of so ci ety into
two classes: higher and lower, party no men cla ture and the “mass”,
which was the over whelm ing ma jor ity of pop u la tion (in so cial sense and
iden ti fi ca tion) with out any dif fer ence to what of fi cial so cial layer peo ple
be longed — to work ing class, kol khoz peas antry or “work ing in tel li gen -
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tsia”. At the same time, of course, there ex isted cer tain dis tinc tions be -
tween no men cla ture of dif fer ent lev els and rep re sen ta tives of other so -
cial groups of var i ous sta tus and pres tige. This sup ported the so cial-sta -
tus hi er ar chy of the “tri an gle” shape (or the pyr a mid-shaped), on top of
which there were the no men cla ture places and the bot tom was filled with 
the most nu mer ous layer, so cial dom i nance of which was re duced to na -
tional sup port of no men cla ture de ci sions. 
How ever, long be fore the peres troika, as it was shown in re search on
so cial-pro fes sional ori en ta tions, the real “tri an gle” of so cial-pro fes -
sional po si tions “turned over” in con scious ness of gen er a tions, which
started their in de pend ent life: the pro fes sions and posts, which made it
pos si ble to oc cupy the higher po si tions of so cial hi er ar chy, be came the
aims of mass ori en ta tions, so, most mass pro fes sions and or di nary
posts be came un at trac tive for the over whelm ing ma jor ity of young peo -
ple [5]. This “over turn” was one of the fac tors that destabilized the ex ist -
ing so cial hi er ar chy, be cause for most rep re sen ta tives of new co horts,
un re al ized pri mary sta tus pre ten sions led to dis sat is fac tion with so cial
sys tem, as far as the so cial sys tem could not solve a con flict be tween the
ideo log i cal ori en ta tion to raised pre ten sions and the old so cial struc -
ture. In the end of 1980s and the be gin ning of 1990s, there hap pened a
sharp rise in so cial pre ten sions of young peo ple, which was reg is tered in
the re searches by V.Magun, who called this pro cess “rev o lu tion of pre -
ten sions” [14].
In or der to sat isfy new am bi tions and pre ten sions, they needed new
priv i leged so cial po si tions, and this could not be re al ized within the
frame works of lim ited and ideo log i cally closed no men cla ture class.
There were too many peo ple want ing to take a few places of nar row cir cle
of so viet elite, and since the old Bolshevik method, when the old no men -
cla ture was ex e cuted by shoot ing and a new no men cla ture was lured,
could not be ap plied any more, there re mained the only way — to al low
some socio-eco nomic free dom and di rect the grow ing de sires to the pri -
vate econ omy sphere.
How ever, the main so cial force of pri vate eco nomic in ter est is so cre -
ative namely be cause it turns so cial life ac cord ing to its own de riv a tive.
So, if it needs new so cial po si tions, then it cre ates them as many as nec -
es sary. But un like evolutional so ci ety de vel op ment, when new el e ments
of so cial struc ture grad u ally re place the old ones or fill the “va cant
places” in de vel op ing socium, the new so cial struc tures and in sti tu tions
emerged prac ti cally at once, as an in stan ta neous so cial re ac tion on re -
moval of ideo log i cal ta boo on pri vate prop erty and en tre pre neur ship.
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At that time, most rul ing bu reau cracy and or di nary cit i zens were not
in ter ested in prin ci pal trans for ma tion of so cial strat i fi ca tion, even if
they de clar a tively sup ported the idea of pub lic sys tem trans for ma tions
and mar ket re forms. Peo ple were not happy about the so cial ist sys tem
ex cept the granted em ploy ment and pos si bil ity of growth for the work ing
class and peas antry that in ev i ta bly re quired re dun dant, struc tur ally
un bal anced cre ation of work ing places and pres ti gious so cial po si tions.
Un like the cap i tal ist sys tem that suf fers, from time to time, from over -
pro duc tion of com mod i ties and ser vices, the so cial ist so ci ety over pro -
duced pro duc ers and con sum ers with the cor re spond ing dis tor tion of
so cial-class and so cial-pro fes sional struc ture. For the last years of its
life un der the USSR, Ukraine could be proud, for ex am ple, that there
were 8,2 stu dents per teacher, whereas in de vel oped west ern coun tries,
the same in dex was al most twice as higher — 15,3, and in de vel op ing
coun t ries — 29,3 [23]. Just be fore the USSR col lapse, the same sit u a tion
was reg is tered for the most so cial-pro fes sional po si tions, re lated to la -
bour of higher qual i fi ca tions. The pride could be valid un less the two fac -
tors, due to which the so cial ist so ci ety was able and forced to pos ses such
 luxu ry: the la bour pay ment did not cor re spond to qual i fi ca tions and the
most skilled la bour was not used in ac cor dance with con tem po rary stan -
dards on ma te rial pro vi sion, or ga ni za tion and qual ity of la bour  activity.
Of course, we could for get our na tional pride and start to re form the
so cial-pro fes sional struc ture by bring ing it to mar ket econ omy. But in
this case, mil lions of peo ple of high qual i fi ca tions would not find places
in the new struc ture. The same takes place in the so cial-class struc ture,
where ex ten sive de vel op ment of ma te rial pro duc tion, sup ported by ideo -
log i cal ori en ta tion to the strong ad vance-guard of so viet so ci ety, brought
about over pro duc tion of the “ad vanced work ing class” — in dus trial wor -
k ers — in the USSR and Ukraine.
If now most in tel li gen tsia and work ing class claims that the power is
re spon si ble for their low sal a ries, that are not paid in the proper time, if
mil lions of work ers of stopped en ter prises have to be on un paid leaves of
ab sence, then this is how, pre vent ing from re forms, bu reau cracy de fend
in ter ests of those so cial groups and lay ers, for which crush of so cial
struc ture, due to rad i cal econ omy trans for ma tions, will mean rad i cal re -
duc tion in their num bers, lost em ploy ment per spec tive (as to their first
pro fes sion) and a ne ces sity of hard com pe ti tion on la bour mar ket. 
Even in Rus sia, be ing con sid er ably ahead of Ukraine in socio-eco -
nomic re form ing, there is still the same old “strat i fi ca tion model”, when
al most all the so ci ety is con cen trated in the base layer” [25]. More over,
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the years of Rus sian in de pend ence in creased a new-no men cla ture layer
of state man ag ers up to half as many. The main rea son of this quan ti ta -
tive growth in Rus sia, Ukraine and other post-so viet states deals with
the ne ces sity of serv ing the old so cial struc ture, ac cord ing to the in sti tu -
tional norms of which the most nu mer ous so cial lay ers still live, and a
newly-formed so cial struc ture — “busi ness-layer”, small en tre pre neurs, 
mer chants etc. In side this over grow ing bu reau cracy, there is an in vis i ble 
war for those ad min is tra tive func tions and work ing places, which deal
with con trol over new struc tures, be cause this con trol is the ba sic pros -
per ity source of cor rupted bu reau cracy.
When old so cial struc ture still ex ists and the party no men cla ture be -
came the rul ing de-ideo log i cal bu reau cracy, which made the luck i est
dem o cratic lead ers their mem bers, in so ci ety, there ap peared a par al lel
so cial struc ture. The new struc ture de vel ops ac cord ing to its own in sti -
tu tional reg u la tions, which could be adopted only by the most ac tive and 
pre pared in di vid u als, who con sti tute an ob vi ous mi nor ity in so ci ety, but
po ten tially as pire to the dom i nant role. The new so cial struc ture in volves 
the so cial-class and pro fes sional groups, which are few in num bers but
their pre ten sions on prop erty and in come are surely much higher than
ex pec ta tions of tra di tional and mass lay ers. New phe nom e non of un -
equivalent so cial ex change (when most peo ple get less than their real en -
dow ment, and a mi nor ity gets much more than it is pos si ble to get from
the le gal in come sources) did not pro mote the merg ing of two struc tures,
it brought about their prin ci pal di vi sion in the pub lic opin ion — on the
one hand, “suf fer ing peo ple”, on the other hand, “suc ceed ing Ma fia”. 
 In de pend ent ex is tence of two so cial struc tures pro vides a new so cial
or der, in which the most ac tive new so cial ac tors do not wish any so ci ety
destabilization, be ing afraid of com mu nist in sti tu tional-struc tural res -
to ra tion, while rep re sen ta tives of mass old lay ers try, with the help of
dou ble institutionalization, to keep (even if partly) their usual so cial
roles and po si tions. As a re sult, a ma jor ity of so ci ety finds con sent in ac -
cept ing the so cial sit u a tion, where old and new so cial in sti tu tions co ex -
ist, pro vid ing le gal ity and le git i macy of so cial or der by their con tra dic -
tory in flu ence.
Pros pects of the Post-So viet So cial
In sti tu tions De vel op ment 
It is ev i dent that the dou ble institutionalization is a phe nom e non that 
is tem po ral, and is pre vent ing dem o cratic so ci ety trans for ma tions. It
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cre ates the enor mous in sti tu tional space and, for most peo ple, per ma -
nently re pro duces the feel ing of so cial help less ness and dis sat is fac tion
with so cial reg u la tions. Their con sent to live un der the dou ble in sti tu -
tional pres sure is rather forced and con di tioned by spe cific fea tures of
“homo postsoveticus” socio-cul tural type, his tor i cal ex pe ri ence of these
peo ple still in cludes a fear of re fus ing from old in sti tu tional sys tem, and
their new post-so viet ex pe ri ence make them aware of no pros pects for
the dou ble in sti tu tional or der. This dou ble nor ma tive-role pres sure in
the post-so viet so ci ety gives prac ti cally no room for noninstitutional so -
cial space, which, ac cord ing to re search ers of so cial cap i tal de vel op ment 
and new so cial move ments, is a source of con tem po rary dem o cratic so -
ci ety de vel op ment and in sti tu tional in no va tions, sup port ing the har mo -
ni ous so cial re la tions de vel op ment [6; 7; 10; 12; 17; 19].
For Ukrai nian so ci ety, pros pects of tran si tion to in ter nally conf lict -
less in sti tu tional sys tem re late to the pos si bil ity of “noninstitutional pol -
icy” de vel op ment, based on ac tiv ity of am a teur so cial move ments and or -
ga ni za tions, which pro mote per fec tion of noninstitutional space and
form the so cial cap i tal to gether with new forms of dem o cratic le gal, po lit -
i cal, eco nomic and spir i tual cul ture. The po ten tial of Ukrai nian so ci ety
in this con text has not been eval u ated yet, and in our opin ion, it should
be the pri or ity di rec tion of fur ther stud ies on new so cial in sti tu tions in
Ukraine.
Ref er ences
1. Bauman Z. In ti ma tion of Postmodernity. — Lon don; New York, 1992.
2. Berger P., Luckmann T. Sotsialnoie konstruirovaniie realnosti. — M., 1995. 
3. Blau P. Ex change and Power in So cial Life. — New York, 1964.
4. Buckley W. So ci ol ogy and Mod ern Sys tems The ory. — Englewood Glifts,
1967.
5. Cherednichenko G.A., Shubkin V.N. Molodiozh vstupaiet v zhizn. — M.,
1985. 
6. Coleman J.S. Foun da tions of So cial The ory. — Cam bridge, 1990.
7. Fukuyama F. The So cial Virtues and the Cre ation of Pros per ity. — New
York, 1996.
 8. Golovakha E., Panina N. Po lit i cal Con scious ness, Le git i macy and Per son -
al ity: Tran si tion from To tal i tar i an ism to De moc racy in Ukraine // R.Farnen
(ed.). In te grating Po lit i cal Sci ence, Socia li sa tion and Ed u ca tion: In ter na tional
Per spec tives for the Next Cen tury. — Oldenburg, 1993. — P.139–152. 
9. Golovakha E., Panina N. Sotsialnyi portret suchasnoi Ukrainy // Napere -
dodni. Ukraina na rubezhi XXI stolittia. — K., 2000. — P.42–53. 
Post-So viet Deinstitutionalization and For ma tion of New So cial In sti tu tions in Ukraine
Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2000–2001 33
10. Hamel P., Lustiger-Tha ler H., Maneu I. Is There and Role for So cial Move -
ment //So ci ol ogy for the Twenty-first Cen tury. Con ti nu ities and Cut ting
Edges. — Chi cago; Lon don, 1999.
11. Homans G.C. So cial Be hav ior: Its El e men tary Forms. — New York, 1961.
12. Inglehart R. Mod ern iza tion and Postmodernization. — Prinston, 1997.
13. Levada Ju. Ot mnenii k ponimaniiu. — M., 2000.
14. Magun V.S. Revolutsia pritiazanii i izmeneniie zhiznennykh strategii v
stolitsakh i provintsii // Kuda id iot Rossiia?.. Sotsialnaia transformatsiia post -
sovetskogo prostranstva. — M., 1996. — P. 306–317. 
 15. McKiney J.C., Tiryakian E.A (eds.).The o ret i cal Sociology. Per spec tives
and De vel op ments. — New York, 1970.
16. Mer ton R. So cial The ory and So cial Struc ture. — Lon don, 1964.
17. Offe C. The New So cial Move ments: Chal leng ing the Bound aries of In sti -
tu tional Pol i tics // So cial Re search. — 1988. — Vol. 52. —  P. 817–868.
18. Panina N., Golovakha Ye. Ten dencies in the De vel op ment of Ukrai nian
So ci ety (1994–2001). So cio log i cal In di ca tors. — K., 2001. 
19. Putnem R.D. Bowling Alone. The Col lapse and Re vival of Amer i can Com -
mu nity. — New York, 2001.
20. Rychard A. Old and New In sti tu tions of Pub lic Life // So ci etal Con flict
and Sys temic Change. The Case of Po land (1980–1992). — War saw, 1992. —
P. 211–224.
21. Slomczynski K., Janicka K., Mach I., Zaborowski W. Men tal Ad just ment to 
the Post-Com mu nist Sys tem in Po land. — War saw, 1999.
22. Turner J. The Struc ture of So cio log i cal The ory. — Home wood, 1974. 
23. Ukraina. Sotsialna sfera u perekhidnyi pe riod. Analiz Svitovoho ban -
ku. — K., 1994. — P. 118.
24. Voitovych S. Problema sotsialnykh institutiv v sotsiolohii // Sotsiolohiia:
teoriia, metody, marketynh. — 1999. — ¹ 2. — P. 151–166.
25. Zaslavskaya T.I. Transformatsia sotsialnoi struktury rosiiskogo ob -
shchest va // Kuda id iot Rossiia?.. Sotsialnaiia transformatsiia postsovetskogo
prostranstva. — M., 1996. — P.17. 
26. Zegbers K. Transformatsii v Rosii ta Skhidnii Yevropi: neoinstitutsio nal na
interpretatsiia // Sotsiolohiia: teoriia, metody, marketynh. — 1998. — ¹ 4–5. —
P. 21–40.
34 Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2000–2001
Yevhen Golovakha, Nataliia Panina
